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Uganda, the first state to refer a situation to the International Criminal Court
(ICC),1 came to exemplify the peace versus justice debate. The Ugandan conflict
with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) raised questions over whether there
must be a choice between successful peace negotiations and prosecution at the
ICC.2 I previously explored the peace versus justice debate in Uganda, which can
also be recharacterized as a debate over what sort of justice, broadly speaking:
Western, retributive justice based on prosecution and incarceration, or traditional,
restorative justice based on tribal ceremonies and reconciliation.3
Using Uganda as an example, I proposed an approach to harmonize these
conceptions of justice in the context of ICC deferrals to traditional justice
mechanisms. This symposium, honoring the work of international criminal
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(March 4, 2016). The author would like to thank Professor Linda Carter and all the organizers and participants
in the symposium.
1. Situation in Uganda, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda (last visited
Aug. 20, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan
Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 211 (2008).
3. Id.
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justice scholar Linda Carter, offers an opportunity to revisit these issues. I will
briefly summarize the Uganda / ICC relationship and the Ugandan / LRA
conflict. I will then recap the ways in which the ICC might defer to Ugandan
proceedings. Next, I will condense my proposal for looking to the goals of
international criminal justice to determine whether the ICC should defer to
Ugandan proceedings such as the traditional justice of mato oput. Finally, I will
bring us up to date with the current controversies related to prosecuting the LRA
in two ways: first, by looking at the ICC case against Dominic Ongwen, the only
alleged LRA commander in ICC custody; and second, by reviewing the bumpy
road to domestic prosecution of alleged LRA leader Thomas Kwoyelo in light of
Uganda’s Amnesty Act.
I conclude that more recent events do not offer much insight on whether
domestic prosecution or traditional alternatives further the goals of international
criminal justice. By contrast, it seems that neither the ICC nor Uganda has faced
the hard questions. Rather than requesting Ongwen be prosecuted in Uganda, it
seems that Uganda found it more convenient, for resource and political reasons,
to leave Ongwen’s controversial prosecution to the ICC. Rather than using the
Kwoyelo case as an opportunity to establish a coherent policy on amnesty or
other non-prosecutorial alternatives, it seems making an example of Kwoyelo
was politically expedient at the time. Although the prosecution of Kwoyelo could
be the harbinger of a push for prosecutorial accountability for LRA in Uganda,
the far more numerous examples of LRA members receiving amnesty call this
into question. Given the difficulties encountered to date in prosecuting Kwoyelo
before domestic courts, it seems unlikely the Ugandan government will be eager
to withhold amnesty from others. A successful conclusion to the Kwoyelo
prosecution, however, may lead to the opposite reaction. At the time of the
writing of this article, the Kwoyelo case had not yet gone to trial.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ICC & UGANDA CASES
The ICC was established by treaty, known as the Rome Statute.4 Its
jurisdiction includes genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (and
possibly crimes of aggression).5 It is a court of “complementary” jurisdiction6—
intended to supplement, not supplant, state prosecutions.7 Under the principle of
complementarity, the ICC only steps in where the state is not acting, or is
unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute those most responsible
for international crimes.8

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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In the case of Uganda, the government asked the ICC to investigate LRA
atrocities.9 The LRA is led by Joseph Kony, who became world-famous due to
the viral video Kony 2012.10 The conflict between the government and the LRA
has raged with varying intensity for years, punctuated by failed peace
initiatives.11 Hundreds of thousands have been displaced by the conflict, and
civilians targeted in raids on villages and internally displaced persons camps.12
The LRA has committed numerous atrocities, but it is perhaps best known for
kidnapping children and forcing them to become LRA fighters or sex slaves.13
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) opened an investigation into crimes
of the LRA (and supposedly all parties to the conflict), a step that is credited by
some with bringing the LRA to the negotiating table.14 ICC arrest warrants,
unsealed in October 2005, charge war crimes and crimes against humanity
against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and
Dominic Ongwen.15 The cases against Odhiambo and Lukwiya were terminated
after their deaths were confirmed by the ICC.16 Otti has reportedly been killed on
Kony’s orders.17 As discussed below, Ongwen is at the ICC awaiting trial.18
The most serious peace negotiations to date took place in Juba in 2006–
2008.19 Though various agreements were drafted, the final deal offered a blend of
prosecutorial and transitional justice mechanisms, leaving unclear whether Kony
was being offered promises of non-prosecution.20 Regardless, Kony refused to
sign the agreement and resumed hostilities in other parts of Africa.21

9. Id. at 215.
10. Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Viral Video, Vicious Warlord, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A35.
11. Keller, supra note 2, at 214–15.
12. Id. at 214.
13. Id. at 213. The LRA’s notoriety for certain crimes, such as abductions, may be overstated in some
sources but nonetheless reflects serious international crimes. See THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND
REALITY 133 (Tim Allen & Koen Vlassenroot, eds., 2010) (discussing perceived versus actual abductions by
LRA).
14. Id. at 216.
15. Id. at 217.
16. Kony et al. Case, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 (July 8, 2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/
Pages/default.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
17. Noel Mwakugu, Obituary: LRA Deputy Vincent Otti, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2008, 14:16 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7083311.stm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); THE
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 18.
18. The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15 (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/uganda/ongwen/Documents/OngwenEng.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 17.
20. Keller, supra note 2, at 209, 218–22.
21. Paul Ronan & Lisa Dougan, Joseph Kony’s LRA Is Still Abducting Children, Even After CAR Votes
for Peace, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2016, 6:02 AM), available at http://www.newsweek.com/joseph-kony-lordsresistance-army-child-soldiers-433360 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also LRA
CRISIS TRACKER REPORTS, https://reports.lracrisistracker.com/ (last visited June 25, 2016) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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The LRA initially demanded that the ICC warrants be withdrawn as a
condition of any agreement,22 setting up a conflict between peace and justice.23 I
believe that the peace versus justice dilemma sets up a false dichotomy. I am not
the first to take this position. Others also say that it is possible to have both peace
and justice.24 The trick is to figure out how to do so. The ICC should not rigidly
require ICC prosecutions in all circumstances. It should defer to states to come
up with alternatives to ICC prosecution when necessary to achieve both peace
and some measure of justice.
II. POTENTIAL AVENUES FOR ICC DEFERRAL
Assuming that Kony is genuinely willing to make peace—a big and rather
dubious assumption—how can the ICC promote both peace and justice? The ICC
can defer to state prosecutions under the Rome Statute, so the ICC could
potentially defer to Uganda if Kony and Uganda agree that Kony will be
prosecuted at the state level, so long as that prosecution is not a sham trial.25 But
what if Kony holds out for something other than prosecution and punishment,
such as a traditional alternative called mato oput? The ICC might be able to defer
to this traditional justice mechanism, but such a finding might stretch the Rome
Statute beyond what some consider its plausible interpretation.26 More
significantly, the ICC should not take such a step unless it also furthers the
apparent goals of international criminal justice.
I should mention some caveats here based on the confusing facts on the
ground. I will focus on Kony’s demand for the nonprosecutorial alternative of
mato oput, as that has been his most consistent position.27 Uganda’s position,
however, is less clear.28 President Museveni has, at times, indicated that
traditional justice like mato oput would be offered as part of the peace deal.29 The

22. Keller, supra note 2, at 211.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at Part III.D.
26. Other scholars have written about the potential ways the ICC might defer to states. For example, in
their forthcoming book, Professors Linda Carter and Charles Jalloh provide insightful analysis of nonjudicial
proceedings in the ICC context, focusing on Articles 17, 21, and 53. They recommend an expert panel to
examine the legal and policy issues regarding the status of nonjudicial alternatives under the Rome Statute
given the uncertainty of the statutory language. Linda E. Carter & Charles Chernor Jaolloh, The Relationship of
International Criminal Courts with National Nonjudicial Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT IN AN EFFECTIVE GLOBAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (forthcoming 2016) (Chapter 4 on file with author).
27. Keller, supra note 2, at 218–21; see THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra
note 13, at 258 for a discussion on how LRA adopted Acholi justice at Juba negotiations despite confusion over
application to Kony. The account in this source indicates that Kony also looked to the example of South Sudan
in seeking both money and a position in the government. Id. at 184.
28. Keller, supra note 2, at 220.
29. Id.
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peace deal itself refers to mato oput and other traditional justice mechanisms.30 It
refers to a truth forum, which seems to be a Ugandan truth commission.31 But it
also refers to state prosecution, albeit with some confusing references to
alternative penalties.32 It seems less likely that Kony would agree to state, but not
ICC, prosecution as part of the peace deal. As a result, I am going to focus on just
one type of non-prosecutorial alternative here: mato oput.33
Mato oput is described as a traditional reconciliation process of the Acholi
tribe of Northern Uganda.34 Kony is Acholi, as are many of his fighters and his
victims.35 Traditionally, the mato oput ceremony was used to resolve conflicts
among clans.36 It is sometimes known as “drinking the bitter root” because the
ceremony includes members of opposing parties drinking a bitter drink
together.37 But mato oput can be far more than that. It can be a complex conflict
resolution process involving fact-finding, mediation, admission of guilt, and
compensation. It is aimed at reintegrating the offender into the community, not as
much on punishing him.38
The Rome Statute sets up several ways in which the ICC could defer to state
action.39 The provisions, however, are rather vague about what constitutes a valid
state prosecution.
It gets even more complicated when it comes to nonprosecutorial
alternatives, such as mato oput, or other alternatives like truth commissions or
amnesties. It is not at all clear how the provisions would work when faced with a
state that wants to assert jurisdiction based on nonprosecutorial mechanisms.40
First, under Article 16, the ICC could follow a request from the UN Security
Council to suspend the investigation or prosecution.41 Under the Rome Statute,
the Security Council has the power to make the political determination that the
ICC investigation or prosecution is a threat to international peace and security.42
If Kony signs a peace deal and disarms, Uganda could ask the Security Council
to make an Article 16 deferral.43 This method’s drawback is that it is only a
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 218.
34. See THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at Chapter 13 for a
discussion of the authenticity of the concept of mato oput and other so-called traditional methods as used by
various actors in the context of Northern Uganda.
35. Keller, supra note 2, at 224, 230.
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id.
38. See id. at Part II, for an extensive discussion of mato oput, including challenges in discerning support
for it and in using a traditional justice mechanism like mato oput in the context of ICC crimes.
39. Id. at 237.
40. Id. at 237–39.
41. Id. at 238.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 238–39.
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temporary measure, for one year, albeit renewable.44 It is not clear that this would
satisfy Kony. Moreover, the trend is shifting away from amnesty and toward
accountability. Nonetheless, it is possible the Security Council could step in to
halt the ICC prosecution against Kony in the interests of peace.45
Second, the ICC could determine that mato oput constitutes a prior
proceeding that would block an accused from being tried a second time under
Article 20.46 Given that it is difficult to put a non-prosecutorial mechanism in the
same class as trial before another court, it is unlikely mato oput would fall under
Article 20.
Third, the ICC could determine that the case against Kony is inadmissible.
Under Article 17, a case is inadmissible if:
1. the case is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by a State
with jurisdiction, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
do so;
2. the case is barred because the person has already been prosecuted by
another court;
3. the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify prosecution.47
With regard to state investigation or prosecution, it is not clear that this
would apply to a traditional justice mechanism like mato oput. Similarly, it is not
clear that undergoing mato oput could constitute a prior prosecution—one that
would bar the ICC from going forward—because it is not a trial by a court.
Finally, it is unlikely that the ICC would determine that the LRA’s crimes are not
sufficiently grave given the facts.48
Thus, a close reading of Article 17 shows it is unlikely that mato oput would
render the case against Kony inadmissible.49 But there is enough ambiguity in the
language that the ICC could stretch the provision to cover traditional justice such
as mato oput, especially if paired with a truth commission.50
A fourth statutory provision is Article 53, which deals with prosecutorial
discretion.51 The Prosecutor could decline to prosecute if it is not in the interests

44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. at Part III.A.
46. Id. at 245.
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 12–13 (July 1, 2002), available at https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
48. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.D.
49. Id.
50. Id. at Part III.D.
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47, at 33.
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of justice.52 Specifically, the statute provides that the Prosecutor can determine
there is no basis for prosecution because it “is not in the interests of justice,
taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the
interests of the victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his
or her role in the alleged crime.”53
Again, the language is vague enough that it might encompass mato oput. In
other words, the Prosecutor could decide that it is in the interests of justice to
allow Uganda to reach a compromise with Kony that would end the conflict,
even if that means promising Kony that he would not be prosecuted. This is
particularly true if the victims strongly support it.54
In fact, this is the argument that some members of the Acholi tribe made to
the then-Prosecutor before he sought the arrest warrants.55 The argument was
obviously unpersuasive. The then-Prosecutor implied that he saw Kony’s
demands as extortion and blackmail—demands that must be rejected.56
Nonetheless, if Kony were to sign the deal and go through the mato oput process,
perhaps the current Prosecutor could reconsider and suspend the prosecution
based on the new facts on the ground.57
III. FURTHERING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Assuming the procedural avenue exists, should the ICC defer to traditional
justice under any circumstances? One could take a hardline retributive justice
position and conclude that the ICC can never defer to a traditional justice
mechanism like mato oput. Anything short of prosecution in a court may be seen
as insufficient. If the ICC is supposed to end impunity, then one could argue that
deferral to traditional justice mechanisms like mato oput violates the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute.58 At the other extreme, one could say the ICC
should defer to anything that a society deems necessary to achieve peace, short of
a self-serving amnesty. I suggest that the ICC should find a principled middle
ground. It should defer to alternative mechanisms when it is necessary for peace
and when it can achieve some measure of justice.59

52. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C.
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47, at 33.
54. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C.
55. Id. at 250.
56. Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Nuremberg: Building a
Future on Peace and Justice (June 24, 2007), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review). In 2007, then-Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated, “Allowed to remain at
large, the criminals ask for immunity under one form or another as a condition to stopping the violence. They
threaten to attack more victims. I call this extortion, I call it blackmail. We cannot yield.”
57. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.C.
58. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 47.
59. Keller, supra note 2, at Part III.D.
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To determine necessity, the ICC would look at whether the alternative is
truly needed to achieve peace. If Kony maintains his insistence on
nonprosecutorial alternatives and continues to commit atrocities, then alternative
measures like mato oput might be a last resort supported by most victims.60
To determine whether traditional mechanisms achieve some measure of
justice, the ICC should look to the goals of the ICC.61 Although ICC goals are
contested, there is general agreement that the ICC is meant to further retribution,
deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice.62 If traditional justice like mato
oput can further these goals to the same extent as ICC prosecution, the ICC
should defer.63 At first glance, ICC prosecution appears superior to mato oput in
achieving these four goals of international criminal justice, but there is more than
meets the eye.
A. Retribution
Retribution typically justifies prosecution and punishment based on
individual culpability: a person is prosecuted and punished because he deserves
it. Retribution is generally linked to criminal prosecution, but its concern with
individual culpability and punishment might be furthered by mato oput to some
extent.64
The process of mato oput requires an investigation and establishment of
individual responsibility.65 Because it requires the offender to admit guilt and
express remorse, it might be similar to prosecution in terms of culpability—
particularly if Kony were to deny responsibility at trial.66
Mato oput might also impose punishment, albeit of a different sort. Rather
than incarceration, the punishment takes the form of compensation and
shaming.67 To Western retributivists, this punishment is clearly insufficient
compared to the thirty years or life imprisonment Kony might face at the ICC.
But from the perspective of the victims, there is less enthusiasm at the idea of
Kony spending the rest of his days in a distant, internationally-approved prison,
with ample food and medical care. One Acholi leader, for example, has noted

60. See id. at Part IV.B. (observing the strength of support for non-prosecutorial alternatives is difficult to
measure and often dependent on context, as one strong proponent of mato oput for the LRA, David Acana
(Acholi paramount chief) subsequently expressed support for the prosecution of LRA leaders in 2008); see also
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY: MYTH AND REALITY, supra note 13, at 260–61 (explaining this could have
been influenced by the failure of the peace process as well as the LRA’s departure from Northern Uganda,
allowing for a more peaceful life for the community).
61. See generally Keller, supra note 2, at 213.
62. See generally id.
63. Id. at 265.
64. Id. at Part IV.C.1.
65. Id. at 229.
66. Id. at 267, 269.
67. Id. at 229

272

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
that Kony should be in the community among those who had suffered, not in an
air-conditioned prison.68 The local shaming component of mato oput might be
seen as greater punishment within the victim community.69
Thus, mato oput might further retributive justice in the eyes of many of the
victims, although it seems that ICC prosecution would still do so to a greater
extent.
B. Deterrence
There is a good argument that mato oput will not deter Kony from reoffending, nor will it deter would-be rebels from committing crimes. Deterrence
is premised on a rational actor model.70 Those who commit atrocities are unlikely
to refrain from doing so for fear of facing mato oput in the future. But the same
can be said for ICC prosecution.71
Moreover, mato oput is likely to reach far more offenders than ICC
prosecution, which focuses on those most responsible.72 Mato oput also
reintegrates offenders into the community.73 Thus, on broad preventive grounds,
mato oput might be more effective, especially if combined with other steps
toward reconciliation like a truth commission. Overall, while mato oput is
unlikely to further deterrence, it likely matches the ICC’s inability to effectively
deter most offenders.74
C. Expressivism
Expressivism, in short, is the idea that the role of the criminal justice system
is to send a message to society.75 The treatment of offenders is supposed to send
a message of condemnation of the act in order to inculcate moral values in
society.76 Mato oput clearly censures the actions of the offender, and its message
is likely effectively communicated on the local level.77 Mato oput might be
particularly powerful because the accused is required to accept responsibility for
the crime, effectively embracing the denunciation inherent in the process.78 A
powerless Kony, admitting guilt and drinking the bitter root in an expression of
68. TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE
ARMY 135 (2006).
69. Keller, supra note 2, at 268.
70. Id. at 272.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 271.
73. Id. at 277.
74. Id. at 273.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 274.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 275.
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remorse and reconciliation, might send a compelling message.79 By contrast, the
expressivist message from Kony’s ICC prosecution might be muffled by a long,
distant criminal trial presumably followed by incarceration in a cushy prison cell.
Thus, mato oput might advance expressivism to the same, if not a greater, extent
as ICC prosecution.80
D. Restorative Justice
Similarly, mato oput might further restorative justice to the same, if not
greater, magnitude as ICC prosecution.81 Restorative justice is focused on
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, reintegration of former
offenders, and restoration of bonds within broader society.82 The mato oput
ceremony is squarely aimed at achieving these goals. It reintegrates the offender
by requiring acknowledgment and compensation on the part of the perpetrator.83
It directly involves the victim reconciling with the perpetrator.84 If paired with
other restorative justice mechanisms like a truth commission, it would also
explore the root causes of the conflict and address the North-South divide in
Uganda.85 Although the ICC allows victim participation to a greater extent than
prior tribunals, it is not as well-suited to addressing reconciliation or reintegration
within the society.86
In summary, my prior analysis of mato oput and the four goals of
international criminal justice yielded the following tentative conclusions. Mato
oput would be less effective, or similarly inept, at achieving retribution and
deterrence. Yet, it would likely be more effective than ICC prosecution at
furthering expressivism and restorative justice. Overall, mato oput could achieve
enough “justice” that the ICC should defer where necessary to achieve peace
even though traditional justice does not mimic ICC prosecution and
punishment.87
IV. RECENT EVENTS
This theoretical approach to ICC deferral could be implemented by the ICC
if Uganda asked the ICC to defer to its domestic proceedings, whether mato oput

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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or otherwise. Kony, however, is still at large.88 Dominic Ongwen, on the other
hand, is no longer in hiding.89 His surrender or capture could have led the ICC
and Uganda to face the question of prosecution versus non-prosecutorial
alternatives like mato oput. Instead, Ongwen is before the ICC without the ICC
or Uganda ever squarely addressing the controversial issue of whether/where he
should be prosecuted. Similarly, Thomas Kwoyelo is on trial in Uganda for LRA
crimes without any apparent reckoning with prosecution versus amnesty.
A. Dominic Ongwen
As noted above, Ongwen is one of two surviving LRA members wanted by
the ICC. The original arrest warrant listed seven counts against Ongwen: three
for crimes against humanity, and four for war crimes.90 After the confirmation of
charges decision issued in March 2016, Ongwen faces trial on seventy counts,
again based on crimes against humanity and war crimes.91 The new charges
include sexual/gender based crimes as well as conscription/use of child soldiers.
Trial is scheduled for December 6, 2016.92
Ongwen was turned over to the ICC under unclear circumstances. Some
sources indicate he turned himself over to US forces in the Central African
Republic (CAR), who seem to have maintained custody.93 In this recounting of
events, Ugandan authorities were involved immediately to confirm Ongwen’s
identity, but indicated that US forces were holding Ongwen.94 Several days later,
Ongwen was flown to The Hague for ICC prosecution.95
Other sources state that after Ongwen left an LRA camp, he was found
wandering near the CAR border by cattle herders, who took him to local forces;

88. Aislinn Laing, A Lord’s Resistance Army Commander Goes on Trial but Joseph Kony Still Eludes
Justice, TIME (Jan. 21, 2016), available at http://time.com/4186861/lra-kony-ongwen/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. Dominic Ongwen, captured LRA commander, will face murder charges in Hague, CBCNEWS (Jan.
20, 2015), available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/dominic-ongwen-captured-lra-commander-will-facemurder-charges-in-hague-1.2921159 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
90. Warrant of Arrest unsealed against five LRA Commanders, Case No. ICC-CPI-20051014-110 (Oct. 14,
2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=warrant+of+arrest+unsealed+against+five+lra+ commanders
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
91. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address how this vast expansion of charges might affect victim
representation, equality of arms, or the ability of the defense to investigate the charges prior to a timely trial.
See, e.g., Danya Chaikel, What Counts against Ongwen—Effectiveness at the Price of Efficiency? JUSTICE IN
CONFLICT (Apr. 15, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/04/15/what-counts-against-ongwen-effectivenessat-the-price-of-efficiency/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. Case Information Sheet–Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, (June 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/uganda/ongwen/Documents/OngwenEng.pdf) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. See, e.g., Human Rights Brief, Dominic Ongwen–ICC to Prosecute LRA Leader, 22 No. 1 Hum. Rts.
Brief 25, 26 (Spring 2015).
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id.
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the local militia commander then arranged to turn him over to US Special Forces,
which in turn handed him over to the Ugandan army.96
In its press release on January 20, 2015, the ICC thanked the United Nations
for its role in enabling the transfer, along with the CAR, Uganda, US, Belgium,
the Netherlands and the African Union (AU) for their cooperation in the
transfer.97 The US State Department press release “welcome[d] the transfer of
Dominic Ongwen by Central African authorities” to the ICC, based on “close
cooperation and consultation by the governments” of the CAR and Uganda,
along with the AU and the ICC.98
Given these differing accounts, it is not clear that Uganda ever had full
custody over Ongwen, though it was certainly involved. According to the
Ugandan Attorney General at the time, Ongwen was in the custody of “the
Ugandan Contingent of the African Union Anti-Lord’s Resistance Army Task
Force,”99 leaving it unclear whether this meant a transfer to Ugandan state
custody. Regardless, Uganda did not formally assert jurisdiction over Ongwen or
seek to prosecute Ongwen before its own courts or via traditional justice like
mato oput.
Uganda does have a mechanism that seems designed to address this situation.
Uganda created a domestic court, now called the International Crimes Division of
the High Court or ICD, as envisioned in the draft peace agreement.100 It has
jurisdiction over international crimes, including genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, terrorism, human trafficking, and piracy.101 According to the
Ugandan Judiciary website, the ICD was intended to be part of a peace deal with
the LRA but has “come to be viewed as a court of ‘complementarity’ with
respect to the [ICC], thus fulfilling the principle of complementarity [in the
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Rome Statute].”102 It does not, however, incorporate traditional justice as
envisioned in the Juba accords.103
The ICD would seem the obvious option for Ongwen’s domestic prosecution.
Although Uganda indicated the ICD is a way to implement the principle of
complementarity and therefore block ICC prosecution, it may be that domestic
prosecution posed complications that the Ugandan government preferred to
avoid. In additional to jurisdictional issues, other complications include
Ongwen’s status as a former abductee of the LRA and Ugandan amnesty laws.
According to then-Attorney General, the Honorable Peter Nyombi,
prosecution before the ICD was not an option.104 The Statement by the
Government on the Dominic Ongwen Case under Attorney General Nyombi’s
name noted that “the cross-border commission of the offenses committed by
Dominic Ongwen and the fact that Uganda had already referred the situation
concerning the LRA to the ICC requires that he be tried by the ICC, rather than
the [International Crimes Division of the] High Court.”105 This statement has
broad implications, as it would seem to apply equally to Joseph Kony. It implies
that Uganda would turn Kony over to the ICC if he were to surrender or be
captured, which contradicts the implications in President Museveni’s prior
comments that a peace deal with Kony would include Ugandan accountability
measures, not ICC prosecution.106
Further, the statement noted the many actors involved (CAR, US, AU, and
the Ugandan military) and indicated that their cooperative effort to turn Ongwen
over to the ICC provided “international clout that requires the perpetrator be tried
by the ICC, in which all the actors would have confidence.”107 In addition, the
decision to send Ongwen to the ICC was endorsed by all the countries in which
Ongwen’s operations had taken place as well as by the AU and US.108 The
Attorney General also noted that any amnesty under Ugandan law would not
block his prosecution at the ICC.109 Thus, the Ugandan government considered
the ICC the proper venue.
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Another jurisdictional issue may be that the ICC arrest warrant focused on
crimes during 2004.110 According to Dixon Odur, Archdiocese of Gulu, Justice
and Peace Commission, the ICD may not be able to address all crimes before
2008.111
One commentator asserts another motivation for the Ugandan government’s
position that Ongwen must be prosecuted by the ICC: to ensure the ICC will not
prosecute government officials for atrocities committed by the government
during the conflict with the LRA.112 President Museveni stated Ongwen had to be
sent to the ICC because he was not captured in Uganda, but according to Mark
Kersten, in reality, Ongwen would have been prosecuted in Uganda if that were
what Museveni wanted.113 Kersten asserted: “In shipping Ongwen to the ICC,
however, Museveni deftly outsourced a potential political problem while, at the
same time, ensuring that the ICC would continue to be dependent on his
cooperation and that, in all likelihood, the government would not be targeted with
prosecution.”114
According to one source, Uganda initially wanted to prosecute Ongwen itself
but “some feared that Ongwen’s ‘status as both victim and alleged author of war
crimes’ could have resulted in . . . a pardon [under the 2000 Amnesty law].”115
These two concerns will be addressed separately: (1) Ongwen’s abduction into
the LRA, and its connection to calls for alternatives to prosecution; and (2) the
potential application of the Amnesty Act, which will be explored in detail in the
case of Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo.116
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Ongwen’s status as victim and victimizer may have encouraged Uganda to
pass off a controversial prosecution to the ICC.117 Ongwen was kidnapped as a
child, though the exact age is disputed.118 Ongwen’s defense argued that, as an
abducted child soldier, Ongwen should not be deemed responsible and/or that he
acted under duress.119 In confirming charges, the ICC gave short shrift to
Ongwen’s abduction into the LRA, leading to criticism of the ICC rather than
Uganda.120
Moreover, some community members in Uganda argue that Ongwen’s status
as a former abductee should protect him from prosecution and punishment.121
Whether the community supports prosecution or alternative justice mechanisms
is a difficult question to answer.122 After the peace talks failed and a renewed
military push led the LRA to flee Northern Uganda, more people were able to
return home; as a result, support for offering the LRA non-prosecutorial
alternatives decreased.123 When the LRA poses a less immediate threat, there is
less opposition to domestic or international prosecution.124
Nonetheless, some in Northern Uganda argue that Ongwen should be
allowed to return home and undergo traditional justice. A prominent Ugandan
organization, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, opposes ICC
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prosecution, arguing for the use of mato oput.125 It contends that mato oput would
foster restorative justice.126 Its position is influenced by Ongwen’s abduction,
citing the failure to protect Ongwen from abduction and the need to recognize
former child soldiers as among the most victimized of the conflict.127
The desire for non-prosecutorial alternatives like mato oput is also motivated
by a desire to see other child soldiers return home, something that might be
discouraged by Ongwen’s prosecution.128 In fact, the Prosecutor of the ICC
issued a statement trying to fight this perception.129 She stressed that LRA
members other than Kony and Ongwen are not under arrest warrant at the ICC.
Additionally, she rebutted rumors that LRA members who return home will be
subject to prosecution, torture, or killing by the ICC.130
Some note that singling out Ongwen when other former child soldiers have
been given amnesty is not fair.131 In particular, more prominent leaders of the
LRA have been given amnesty, making Ongwen—an abducted child—especially
undeserving of prosecution.132 One commentator cites a radio station survey and
Refugee Law Project survey indicating “many people already think that Ongwen
should be pardoned because he was a child at the time of his abduction.”133
Many in Northern Uganda are still waiting for their children to return from
being abducted into the LRA.134 Others realize their own returned children are
still trying to cope with the crimes that they were coerced into committing while
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with the LRA.135 Furthermore, the prosecution of a former abducted child may
“morally absolve the government for its failure to protect them.”136
This is not to say that opinion is uniform. To the contrary, one survey
respondent stated that in Acholi society, even young children know killing is
wrong.137 Others noted that Ongwen should be prosecuted because he failed to
take advantage of amnesty, but rather stayed and continued to commit crimes138
when he could have escaped.139 Many civil society respondents supported ICC
prosecution for Ongwen.140 The Ugandan Attorney General asserted that
traditional justice mechanisms like mato oput can be used by LRA members who
surrender, but not if they are LRA leaders or under arrest warrant by the ICC.141
The varied opinions over whether Ongwen should be prosecuted at the ICC,
or at all, echo the concerns over prosecuting Kony to some extent. Bringing us
back to the peace versus justice debate, there is a concern that Ongwen’s
prosecution will prevent fighters from laying down their arms, parallel to fears
that threatening to prosecute Kony kept him from a peace deal. The same
controversy over what constitutes justice resurfaces: retributive justice focused
on prosecution of Ongwen, or restorative justice featuring non-prosecutorial
mechanisms like matu oput.
It is possible that Uganda’s action (or inaction) leading to Ongwen’s ICC
prosecution could be seen as a principled choice, based on the legitimacy of the
ICC, the unclear support for non-prosecutorial alternatives, and a justifiable
reliance on prosecution in terms of advancing the goals of international justice.
But the motivations of the Ugandan government have been called into question
by some, leading to speculation that the failure to request a deferral in this case is
not grounded in a judgment that prosecution at the ICC will most effectively
achieve international justice or accountability. Rather, there are suspicions that
the true rationale is based on a cost-benefit analysis focused on the government
rather than the victims. To wit, that the Ugandan government would rather let the
ICC tackle the controversial issue of how much to take into account the prior
victim status of a former child soldier once he becomes an adult; and/or that the
Ugandan government is manipulating the ICC into a position where state
cooperation is necessary such that it will not pursue any investigations into
culpability of governmental forces or officials. Avoiding the prosecution of
Ongwen in the ICD also avoids another tangled web of issues illustrated by the
Kwoyelo case.
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B. Thomas Kwoyelo
Some of those who support ICC prosecution do so because they fear that if
Ongwen returned to Uganda, he would be entitled to amnesty. Amnesty has been
given to a number of other LRA members, including more high-ranking leaders,
who are now living freely in Uganda.142 Even President Museveni himself
apparently indicated shortly after the collapse of Juba that “LRA leaders who had
indicated a willingness to surrender, Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo,
could be eligible for amnesty.”143
Uganda has repeatedly renewed a broad amnesty law. It provides amnesty to
Ugandans who have engaged in acts of war or armed rebellion against the
government of Uganda since January, 1986.144 More than 27,000 Ugandans have
received amnesty since 2000.145 The act has been extended and appears to be
currently in force.146 Amnesty is supported by many Northern Ugandans who
want their abducted family members to come home without facing prosecution
for crimes they may have been coerced or brainwashed into committing.147
The amnesty issue has become quite complicated. One captured alleged LRA
leader not wanted by the ICC, Thomas Kwoyelo, sought amnesty in January,
2010.148 Kwoyelo attests that he was abducted by the LRA in 1987 at age 13. He
was captured by Ugandan forces in 2008.149 Given the language of the Amnesty
Act and prior practice, Kwoyelo’s amnesty could have been granted as a matter
of course. But the government (specifically, the Directorate of Public
Prosecutions, or DPP) effectively rejected his request. Kwoyelo was initially
charged with 12 counts under the Geneva Conventions Act, but the indictment
was later amended at the ICD to “53 counts of war crimes under the Geneva
Conventions Act, with alternative charges including murder, kidnapping with
intent to murder, attempted murder and robbery under the Penal Code Act Cap
120.”150
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SECTOR, REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (2011), available at https://www.jlos.go.ug:442/index.php/news-mediaevents/newsroom/news-archive/item/200-justice-at-cross-roads-a-special-report-on-the-thomas-kwoyelo-trial

282

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
This seems in direct conflict with the routine application of the Amnesty Act,
as Kwoyelo was not excluded.151 In fact, on September 22, 2011, the Ugandan
Constitutional Court initially ruled for Kwoyelo when he challenged the failure
to award him amnesty.152 The Constitutional Court found a violation of equal
treatment under the Amnesty Act.153 The Constitutional Court rejected the DPP’s
argument that the Amnesty Act is unconstitutional.154 It noted that the DPP could
still prosecute persons declared ineligible for amnesty under a 2006 amendment
to the act.155
The Ugandan Supreme Court, however, recently harmonized the Amnesty
Act with the prosecution of Kwoyelo.156 Rejecting the claim that the Amnesty
Act was unconstitutional, it found that the act was proper but that amnesty could
be withheld from those who committed certain crimes.157 Specifically, the act
covers only crimes committed in support of rebellion, which the Supreme Court
determined excluded not only personal crimes, but also crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, such as attacks
against civilians.158 The Supreme Court also found that the Amnesty Act does not
violate Uganda’s duties under international law.159
The Supreme Court specifically referred to the Juba agreements, noting “both
the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army fully understood that there
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would be accountability by certain individuals who may have committed certain
criminal acts.”160 Although the final agreement was not signed by Kony, the
Supreme Court looked to it as evidence of the intentions of the parties; in
particular, for the principle that “individuals should take personal responsibility
for grave breaches of the law” while being given due process of law.161 As a
result, “none of the parties envisaged that [the Amnesty Act] granted amnesty for
grave crimes. . . . The International Crimes Division of the High Court seems to
have been created as a consequence of this.”162
The Supreme Court rejected Kwoyelo’s argument that he was treated
unfairly because other LRA commanders had been given amnesty.163 It noted
Kwoyelo did not assert that he and other LRA commanders had committed
similar crimes; the Supreme Court further assumed that the DPP must have
determined in those cases that amnesty did apply.164 It also noted that Kwoyelo
did not show that he had been discriminated against in any way.165
The Supreme Court also addressed the peace versus justice debate.166 It noted
that impunity would not bring peace, but rather those who committed
international crimes must first be prosecuted, while “reconciliation and pardon
mechanisms” may be put in place after trial.167 The Supreme Court stated that a
peace deal between the LRA and the government “would illustrate the desire to
have peace based on granting amnesty for war or rebellion, while at the same
time demanding accountability by individuals for grave crimes committed
against the population.”168 Echoing the words of former ICC Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo,169 the Court stated, “Peace based on impunity by people who
may wish to hold the rest of society hostage and blackmail cannot be the peace
envisaged in the Constitution.”170
Kwoyelo’s trial was supposed to start on May 3, 2016, but has been
repeatedly pushed back.171 In August, the court adjourned a pre-trial hearing until
160.
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Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 62.
Id.at 47.
Id.at 63.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Building a Future on Peace and Justice, ICC (June 24, 25, 2007), available
at
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INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR (May 5, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/05/the-kwoyelo-case-at-theicd-the-realities-of-complementarity-in-practice/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (delay
to July); Commentary, Kwoyelo Trial Postponed (Again) in Ugandan Court: Causes and Ramifications,

284

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 48
September 21, 2016 because of issues with the disclosure of evidence and notice
of the hearing to Kwoyelo’s attorneys. 172 In September, Kwoyelo’s lawyers
challenged the judge presiding over the pre-trial on the ground that the judge is
not part of the ICD of the High Court.173 After the judge refused to recuse herself
because High Court judges have jurisdiction on all cases, the defense indicated it
would appeal.174 Even if this matter is resolved expeditiously, other pre-trial
issues may remain.
The delays have raised questions about the fairness of the trial. According to
the Ugandan Supreme Court, Kwoyelo was captured in 2005 and sought amnesty
in 2010.175 He has remained in custody even though, based on the Constitutional
Court’s ruling for amnesty, he should have been released during 2011-2015.176
There are reports that Kwoyelo’s appeal for his release was postponed to July 18,
2016 due to a lack of funds to hold the hearing.177 Kwoyelo has also raised
concerns about lack of resources for his defense team.178
According to commentary by the International Justice Monitor, there are
other concerns regarding Uganda’s ability to carry out the trial.179 The new Rules
of Procedure have been passed and are being used, although they are not formally
in force.180 The ICD has only ad hoc procedures and limited funds for outreach
and witness relations; the Registrar of the ICD indicated that the delay in the trial

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR (July 22, 2016), available at http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/07/kwoyelotrial-postponed-again-in-ugandan-court-causes-and-ramifications/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
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173. Julius Ocungi, Kwoyelo’s lawyers question legality of presiding judge, MONITOR (UGANDA) 2016
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in the journal Good Governance Africa).
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SYRACUSE J. INT’L L & COM. 407, 419 (2013) (discussing fair trail concerns given Kwoyelo’s length in
detention, lack of access to counsel/funding and translation).
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University of the Pacific Law Review).
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is “because the court is still struggling to mobilize funding to carry out outreach
with victim communities prior to restarting the trial.”181 Due to a lack of
resources, the ICD is seeking interns and volunteers for critical functions related
to victims, witnesses, and outreach.182 Although the Registrar has indicated the
prosecution should seek witness protection measures from the government, it
appears that a formal witness protection program is not yet in place.183 Other
resource issues include infrastructure.184 Kwoyelo’s initial appearance was
overcrowded, leading the ICD to seek ICC help in televising future
proceedings.185 This request seems beyond the scope of ICC assistance in
general, all the more so given that Kwoyelo has never even been under arrest
warrant by the ICC.
The Kwoyelo case is also being watched closely to determine whether it
discourages other LRA fighters from returning.186 It is not clear if the prosecution
of Kwoyelo is the start of a trend or an aberration. The case of Caesar Acellam is
often contrasted with Kwoyelo.187 According to some reports, when Acellam was
captured in 2012, the DPP brought charges against him and an arrest warrant was
issued; but the Ugandan army reportedly did not turn over Acellam, who was
providing information on the LRA to the forces in Northern Uganda.188 It appears
that Acellam was granted amnesty in 2015.189
It is possible that the more recent Supreme Court decision will clear the way
for more prosecutions in the future. Prior to the decision, the head of Uganda’s
Amnesty Commission indicated his belief that there was no choice but to grant
amnesty to those who seek it.190 The Supreme Court decision may have made
clear that amnesty can be withheld if the DPP presses charges before the ICD.
The difficulties seen in Kwoyelo’s trial to date, however, may discourage further
prosecutions. At the time of this writing, the ICD trial had yet to commence.
There does not seem to be a coherent or well-developed strategy for choosing
between prosecution, whether ICC or state, and amnesty. In discussing
Kwoyelo’s prosecution, for example, Sarah Nouwen argues that there was no
clear policy regarding the application of the Amnesty Act to Kwoyelo.191 Rather,
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the motivation seemed to be tied to the fact that the ICC Review Conference was
soon to be held in Uganda. According to one prosecutor: “‘The ICC Review
Conference put Uganda in the spotlight; then it is not good to grant an
amnesty.’”192 Even the arguments before the Constitutional Court to strike down
the Amnesty Act as unconstitutional were apparently not part of an official
strategy, as the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General apparently did
not approve the argument in advance.193 In sum, “[t]he prosecution of Kwoyelo
was prompted by opportunism rather than law or policy.”194 The desire to “make
an example of Kwoyelo” to show the ICD was taking action may have abated
now that the ICD’s caseload includes active terrorism cases.195
The most significant remaining question is what impact the prosecution of
Kwoyelo might have on Kony. It seems likely it will further discourage Kony
from entering into any peace deal that involves his surrender. Kony was
unwilling to sign the peace deal when its language was ambiguous as to whether
he would face state prosecution or alternative justice mechanisms like mato
oput.196 Subsequent practice and case law indicate that it is improbable that Kony
would receive amnesty for all his crimes. More likely, Kony would be prosecuted
before the ICD if he were not turned over to the ICC. Given the political
considerations and resource issues, it seems more likely the Ugandan government
would outsource the prosecution to the ICC, thereby saving it the costs and likely
ensuring the culpability of government actors would not be addressed by the
ICC. All of this seems to be a moot point, however, as Kony’s actions since the
peace negotiations do not indicate any genuine interest in a peace process with
Uganda. Skepticism was warranted in 2008.197 It is even more plausible now,
given Kony’s resumption of atrocities, albeit with a depleted force.198
Although it “may seem that little was lost” when it comes to Kony, the
impacts of Uganda’s approach may nonetheless undermine broader transitional
justice for Uganda.199 The Ugandan government has apparently not made
significant progress in implementing other types of restorative justice
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mechanisms.200 According to one commentator, the Ugandan government is not
interested in truth-telling, for fear of its own members being accused and for fear
of costly reparations.201 Sarah Nouwen indicates that the cabinet did not allow
transitional justice instruments to be implemented even though they had been
part of the Juba accords.202 Nouwen contends that aspects of the peace deal “that
involved burdens on the state and were unlikely to be funded by donors, for
instance reparations, were ignored.”203 She concludes: “When other options, such
as militarily defeating the LRA, providing an amnesty or handing over the LRA
leadership to the ICC promise to be more convenient, the [Ugandan government]
is likely simply to discard its newfound commitment to domestic legal
accountability and leave lawyers without a role to play.”204
Victims remain uninformed and hold possibly false expectations, such as
believing that ICC prosecution of Ongwen will yield significant reparations.205
While reparations may be possible through the Trust Fund for Victims in the
event Ongwen is convicted, it seems unlikely they will receive significant
compensation given the number of victims and inadequacy of the resources.206
This could turn victims against the ICC, possibly leading to greater support by
victims of Ugandan traditional justice mechanisms. On the other hand, although
the Ugandan government has launched some aid programs in the North, to date
the government has not offered the anticipated comprehensive reparations
program.207 Moreover, recent work by Luke Moffett indicates that in addition to
reparations, victims seek punishment of those most responsible from the LRA
and Ugandan military.208 Finally, the position of Ugandan victims and the
government may shift if the LRA resumes significant activity in Northern
Uganda.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Ongwen and Kwoyelo cases could have presented opportunities for
Uganda and the international community to grapple with serious questions raised
by different theoretical approaches to peace and justice. Yet, neither seems to
have yielded a well thought-out approach or strategy. It remains to be seen
whether future opportunities will present themselves, and, if so, whether the
Ugandan government and international community are able to take advantage of
them to advance peace with justice.
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